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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. May the New Union Department of Natural Resources
exercise CERCLA natural resource damage trusteeship
over the area affected by the chemical spill on April 27,
1992, onto land owned by Tippecanoe Logging Co.?
II. Is the Tippecanoe Logging Co. excused from liability
under CERCLA sec. 107(b) under any of the defenses
listed or a combination of them?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Appellant, Tyler-2 Mining Inc., has appealed the decision
of the district court on the issues of trusteeship and liability
resulting from a hazardous waste incident.
In September 1992, the New Union Department of Natu-
ral Resources filed suit in the United States District Court for
the District of New Union. The suit sought-natural resource
damages from Tyler-2 Mining Inc. and Tippecanoe Logging
Co.
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B. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tyler-2 Mining Inc., (T2M) owns and operates a unionite
ore mine on land located within Harrison Forest. The prop-
erty is commonly referred to as Site 18. T2M's property is
surrounded by land owned by Tippecanoe Logging Company
(TLC), one of the nation's largest producers of forest products.
(R. 1). After discovering a rich vein of unionite ore on Site 18,
TLC sold the property to Mine-Finders Inc. Mine-Finders re-
sold the property to T2M.
A small local company, T2M purchased Site 18 from
Mine-Finders to mine the ore and, also, to provide alternative
employment for the local community. At the time, the Harri-
son Forest community was dependant upon agriculture and
forest products as the predominate basis of its economy. (R.
2). It was hoped that the mine would diversify the commu-
nity's economic base.
In both transactions the property was sold for cash in fee
simple absolute. The only method of ground access to Site 18
is along Access Road #5, a private road. TLC owns and main-
tains Access Road #5. (R. 2). When T2M purchased Site 18,
its deed included a "transferable right of entry and exit to
Site 18 on Access Road #5." (R. 2). The deed from TLC to
Mine-Finders included the same right of entry provision.
Since purchasing the site in 1989, T2M has operated its
mine in complete compliance with all federal and state regu-
lations. All required permits have been obtained from the
New Union Department of Environmental Protection
(NUDEP). (R. 2). As part of the transfer from Mine-Finders
to T2M, a deed provision was incorporated that required T2M
to have the operational and maintenance status of a surface
impoundment inspected annually, by a NUDEP approved in-
dependent contractor. An annual environmental audit, con-
ducted by an independent firm, is also required by the
provision. (R. 2-3). The independent contractor clause was
inserted in the deed to obtain zoning approval from the Har-
rison County Board of Supervisors. (R. 2).
The process that T2M uses to "wash waste rock away
from the unionite ore" produces a highly acidic leachate. (R.
19941 765
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2). Chemicals in the leachate are especially toxic to plant life.
(R. 2). A surface impoundment collects the leachate. The
leachate is transported off site by truck to a licensed incinera-
tor at 45 day intervals. (R. 2).
On April 27, 1992 a crack developed in the wall of the
surface impoundment. Within fifteen minutes the leachate
had spread onto land owned by TLC. (R. 3). The land where
the leachate came to be located is the habitat of two endan-
gered species (the purple daisy and the blue robin) and one
species which a petition to list as endangered has been filed
(the green swallow). The only known habitat of the species of
wild flower known as the purple daisy is on TLC's property in
Harrison Forest. The purple daisy is listed as endangered
under 16 U.S.C. sec. 1531 of the Endangered Species Act. (R.
1). Every fourth year the green swallow lays its eggs on the
leaves of the purple daisy; this is the only place green swal-
lows lay their eggs. Purple daisies receive an essential nutri-
ent from the egg shells of the green swallow. The blue robin's
only known habitat is on TLC's property within Harrison
Forest.
As a result of the leachate deposition on TLC's property:
10% of the former population of purple daisies remain alive,
and the trees and shrubs where the blue robins nest will be
dead within five to eight years. (R. 3). NUDNR filed suit in
the United States District Court for the District of New
Union to compel T2M and TLC to provide funding for a re-
propagation and habitat study for the affected species. (R. 3).
NUDNR has been designated as the government entity repre-
senting federal and state interests. (R. 3-4). NUDNR asserts
that under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) § 107(a)(1)-(4)(c)
both T2M and TLC are responsible parties for the natural re-
source damages. In addition, NUDNR contends it has au-
thority to act in the capacity of a natural resource trustee
over the privately owned land of TLC. (R. 3).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/8
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court ruled that a trusteeship could be as-
serted over private property even though the regulations pro-
viding for the establishment of a trusteeship do not clearly
indicate that such a trusteeship can be maintained. In inter-
preting the statute in such a manner, the court has deter-
mined congressional intent in an area where Congress had
the power to regulate, had they so desired. The absence of
such wording in the regulation gives clear indication Con-
gress had no desire to regulate the use of private property
and to leave this regulation to the states.
The district court excused TLC from liability based on
the framework of the statutory defenses allowed under CER-
CLA § 107(b). TLC is a covered person under CERCLA
§ 107(a)(1). This liability is, by definition, strict, joint and
severable. TLC can not receive relief from the limited statu-
tory provisions provided for in CERCLA § 107(b) as Congress
did not provide an exception from CERCLA liability for land-
owners like TLC.
ARGUMENT I
I. THE NEW UNION DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES CAN NOT EXERCISE NATURAL
RESOURCE DAMAGE TRUSTEESHIP OVER
TIPPECANOE LOGGING COMPANYS
PRIVATELY OWNED LAND.
A. The trial court inappropriately asserted a natural
resources trusteeship over TLC's property.
The District Court's decision concerning natural re-
sources liability under CERCLA was based on the interpreta-
tion of both CERCLA and the Endangered Species Act. (R. 5).
Its holding was based on a question of law and appellate re-
view, therefore, is de novo. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S.
552, 557 (1988). ("For purposes of standard of review, deci-
sions by judges are traditionally divided into three categories,
denominated [as] questions of law (reviewable de novo)...").
1994] 767
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B. The plain language of CERCLA does not support
imposing a natural resources trusteeship over
privately owned land.
"In attempting to discern the intent of Congress in enact-
ing a particular statutory section, [the court] must examine
the language of the statute and, if there is ambiguity, the pol-
icy behind it. The starting point is always the plain meaning
of the words used." Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 713 F.
Supp. 1484, 1488 (1989). Whether the intent of Congress is
"clear and unambiguous does not depend on whether a partic-
ular phrase of the statutory text standing all alone .
[r]ather, the court must look beyond "the particular statutory
language at issue" and examine "the language and design of
the statute as a whole." Ohio v. United States Dept. of Inte-
rior, 880 F.2d 432, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1989)(quoting K Mart Corp.
v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988)).
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act of 1980 language concerning when a
state or federal authority may properly impose a trusteeship
over natural resources is plain and unambiguous. Trustee-
ship may only be imposed over those resources that are either
owned, controlled, or managed by a governmental authority.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (1980). Specifically, CERCLA
§ 107(f)(1) states that "liability shall be to the United States
Government and to any State for natural resources within
the State or belonging to, managed by, controlled by, or ap-
pertaining to such State. . ." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1). [emphasis
added]. Further, the statute provides that when seeking nat-
ural resource damages, "the President, or the authorized rep-
resentative of any State, shall act on behalf of the public as
trustee of such natural resources to recover for such dam-
ages." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(A). [emphasis added].
The words "belonging to, managed by, controlled by, or
appertaining to" restrict the ability of the government to as-
sert a trusteeship to those natural resources over which the
government can assert one of the statutorily indicated inter-
ests. Ohio v. United States Dept. of Interior, 880 F.2d at 459
(rejecting the argument that CERCLA "covers injuries to any
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/8
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land, water, air, fish and wildlife that exist 'within [a] State'
-a reading which, if true, would establish natural resource
damage liability for harm to all private as well as public
property."). Even allowing for the statute's broad remedial
purpose, these words cannot be read out of the statute where
they can otherwise be given meaning. Stepan Chem. Co., 713
F. Supp. 1484 (D. Pa. 1989) (wherein the court looked to the
clear and unambiguous language of CERCLA and the policies
behind the act and strictly construed the statutory definition
of "state" as applied to the NCP to exclude municipalities).
To give meaning to these words and, therefore, to bring
itself within the statute, the alleged trustee must demon-
strate that it has one of the listed interests in the natural
resources located on the land. However:
It should be noted, however, that while the statute ex-
cludes purely private resources, it clearly does not limit the
definition of 'natural resources' to resources owned by a
government. If that were the meaning of sec. 101(16), then
all the phrases other than 'belonging to' would be surplus-
age. If the words 'managed by, held in trust by, appertain-
ing to, or otherwise controlled by' mean anything at all,
they must refer to certain types of governmental (federal,
state or local) interests in privately-owned property.
Ohio v. United States Dept. of Interior, 880 F.2d at 460.
These interests are not present on privately owned prop-
erty, such as TLC's, which is owned in fee simple by the pri-
vate landowner and where the owner has complied with all
statutory and deed restrictions that may have been imposed
on the property by the state authority.
C. The legislative history corroborates the
interpretation inferred by the statute's plain
language.
"The legislative history of CERCLA further illustrates
that damage to private property - absent any government
involvement, management or control - is not covered by the
natural resource damage provisions of the statute. Ohio v.
United States Dept. of Interior, 880 F.2d at 460. Had Con-
1994] 769
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gress intended natural resource damages to be recoverable
for damage done to land, fish, wildlife, or other biota on pri-
vately owned land it could have done so simply by leaving out
the restrictive language. Id. This suggestion was not only
considered by the Congress, but rejected when the final ver-
sion of CERCLA was adopted. Id. ("Congress quite deliber-
ately excluded purely private property from the gambit of the
natural resource damage provisions.").'
D. NUDNR did not satisfy its burden of proving an
interest in the natural resources on TLC's
property.
The NUDNR was designated to represent both the fed-
eral and the state trustee interests. In order for the NUDNR
trustee to collect under CERCLA § 107(f)(1) it must first
prove that it has either a state or a federal interest to assert.
42 U.S.C. § 9607. As discussed above, that interest must be
either by the way of ownership, management, control, or
trust over the natural resource.
1. New Union does not own, manage, or control
natural resources on TLC's property.
The state of New Union did not have ownership interests
in either the land or over the wildlife on the land. (R. 1).
("TLC owns large tracts of forests in six states. One of TLC's
tracts, most of Harrison Forest in the State of New Union
•."). Nor does New Union manage or control the land or its
resources. Id. In fact, it has allowed the forest, which in-
cludes the waste site, to be logged by TLC. Id. ("One of TLC's
1. The full extent of the section's applicability to privately owned natural
resources was called into question by Department of Interior regulations and
subsequent argument in this case. The Court of Appeals remanded the regula-
tions back to the department for clarification on this point. See Ohio v. United
States Dept. of Interior, 880 F.2d at 461. Consistent with the Ohio court's inter-
pretation of section 101(16), the department subsequently proposed rules indi-
cating that "The Department never intended to suggest that the applicability of
the rule hinges solely on ownership of a resource by the government entity."
Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 43 C.F.R. Part 11 (proposed July 22,
1993).
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tracts,.. . is 18 square miles of some of the finest old growth
hardwood forests left in the United States.").
2. The common law public trust doctrine does not
support NUDNR's claim to the wildlife on
TLC's property.
The common law public trust doctrine provides the re-
maining possibility for New Union to assert a claim to either
TLC's land or to the resources on the land. The NUDNR has
not demonstrated that the doctrine applies to this situation.
The "New Union Supreme Court held in 1979 that the public
trust does not include privately held land." (R. 4). Therefore,
the state must be able to exert an interest over the natural
resources on the land, i.e., its wildlife, in order to bring itself
within CERCLA § 107(f)(1).
"New Union's law regarding wildlife follows the common
law rule." (R. 4). The common law rule has been subject to
flux in recent years. It is unlikely, however, that New
Union's Supreme Court would find that the public trust doc-
trine applied to the natural resources located on TLC's land.
The public trust doctrine is a common law rule that al-
lows states the "authority to define the limits of the lands
held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such
lands as they see fit." Philips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,
484 U.S. 469, 474 (1988); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26
(1894). Philips Petroleum reaffirmed the U.S. Supreme
Court's "longstanding precedents which hold that the States,
upon entry into the Union, received ownership of all lands
under waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide." Philips
Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 475, 476. The state interest in the
lands held in the public trust includes "bathing, swimming,
recreation, fishing, and mineral development." Philips Petro-
leum, 484 U.S. at 482. Given this background, the Court has
construed the public trust doctrine to apply to natural re-
sources either within the state's navigable waters or within
waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. Id. at 478-79.
While the Supreme Court did not retreat from its view
that it is within the state's authority to define the limits of
1994] 771
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the lands within their boundaries that are held in the public
trust, the Court may have limited that rule in Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). The Hughes Court rejected
the long held notion that "wild animals and fish within a
state's border are, so far as capable of ownership, owned by
the state in its sovereign capacity for the common benefit of
all its people." Hughes, 441 U.S. at 325, (quoting Lacoste v.
Department of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545 (1924)). In so
doing:
The Court overruled Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519
(1896) invalidating on Commerce Clause grounds a state
ban on interstate transportation of wildlife lawfully caught
in the state and completing the long erosion of Geer's the-
ory of state ownership of wildlife. The court recognized,
however, that states retain an important interest in the
regulation and conservation of wildlife and natural
resources.
Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 671 (1st Cir.
1980).
The Hughes court affirmed, however, the Geer dissent's
theory that ownership and commerce in wild game was "arti-
ficial and formalistic." Hughes, 441 U.S. at 328. The Geer
dissent's view was that "[when] any animal . . . is lawfully
killed for the purposes of food or other uses of man, it be-
comes an article of commerce, and its use cannot be limited to
the citizens of one State to the exclusion of citizens of another
State." Hughes, 441 U.S. at 328-29 (quoting Geer, 161 U.S.,
at 541 (Field, J., dissenting)).
The Hughes decision was grounded on the Commerce
Clause, and not the public trust doctrine, so its effect on the
various state definitions of wildlife held in the public trust is
not absolute. Id. at 323. However, given that wild birds and
windblown seeds do not recognize state boundaries, states
should be reluctant to assert control over natural resources in
the name of the public trust. The court cited Idaho Code sec.
36-103(a) to support its finding that "Idaho is the trustee on
behalf of the citizens of Idaho of all Idaho's wildlife ... Idaho
is the proper party to bring a suit for damages to its natural
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/8
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resources under CERCLA." Idaho v. Southern Refrigerated
Transp., Inc., 1991 WL 22479, at *5 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 1991).
The NUDNR has not cited a similar statute applicable in this
action, relying, instead, on the common law public trust
doctrine.
The species at issue in this case are particularly inappro-
priate for being part of the state public trust interest. The
green swallow is migratory. (R. 1). ("Every fourth year, when
the green swallows swoop through their flyway . . ."). This
indicates that the swallow crosses state lines, making it di-
rectly subject to interstate commerce and the Commerce
Clause. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 328. ("[E]ven state regulations
of wild game have been held subject to the strictures of the
Commerce Clause under the pretext of distinctions from
Geer."). It lays its eggs on the purple daisy. Considering the
impact that the purple daisy and the green swallow have on
the tourism industry and the thousands of individuals from
"around the world who fill motels and campgrounds through-
out central New Union to watch the swallows' unique flying
formations," anything that the legislature proposed concern-
ing this wildlife would impact that national industry. (R. 1).
"Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a le-
gitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in re-
lation to the putative local benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
Additionally, the purple daisy falls under the federal pro-
tection of the Endangered Species Act, as does the blue robin.
(R. 1-2). The ESA permits state statutes to be more restric-
tive than federal law concerning the endangered species. 16
U.S.C. § 1535(f). Even granting that provision, because of
the nature of the species involved here, the strong federal in-
terest, current U.S. Supreme Court holdings concerning state
ownership of wildlife, and the interstate commerce issue it
would be unlikely for the New Union Supreme Court to find
that its public trust doctrine was appropriate to apply in this
action. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 334 n. 15 ("'In more recent years
... the Court has recognized that the States' interest in regu-
1994] 773
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lating and controlling those things they claim to 'own,' includ-
ing wildlife, is by no means absolute.'" (quoting Foster-
Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928)).
Since the state of New Union has not demonstrated a
possessory, management, control, or trust interest in the nat-
ural resources found on TLC's land, it does not qualify as a
CERCLA natural resources trustee for those resources.
E. The NUDNR did not establish that the Endangered
Species Act provided the federal government an
interest within the meaning of CERCLA
sufficient to bring the federal government
within CERCLA § 107(f)(1).
The lower court held that the ESA reflected "a congres-
sional decision to exert substantial governmental control over
endangered species no matter where they are located, and
that the NUDNR can exercise trusteeship over the affected
area." (R. 5). The plain language of the ESA does not support
this holding.
1. The Endangered Species Act does not impose a
trustee relationship on the federal
government for the benefit of endangered
species.
Although the court did not explain the basis for this con-
clusion, the language of the opinion indicates the court's be-
lief that the ESA puts the federal government in the position
of a trustee for endangered species. The plain language of the
statute does not support this conclusion as there is no provi-
sion in the act that designates the federal government, or
anyone, to be an endangered species trustee. 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-44. In the absence of such a provision, one should
not be inferred. The court cannot construe CERCLA
§ 107(a)(4)(A) to allow a municipality to proceed as a state
when there is no support in either the statutory language or
the legislative history of CERCLA for such a result. Stepan
Chem. Co., 713 F. Supp. at 1488
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/8
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Initially, it is noted that Congress is well capable of writ-
ing a provision appointing a trustee for natural resources.
When Congress has intended for a trustee to be designated, it
has said so. For example: "The President shall designate...
Federal officials who shall act on behalf of the public as trust-
ees for natural resources." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(a); "The
Governor of each State shall designate... trustees for natu-
ral resources." 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (f)(2)(b). See also Oil Pollu-
tion Act of 1990 33 U.S.C. §§ 1006(b)(3), 2706(b)(2), which
mirror the above-cited CERCLA provisions. The ESA does
not contain a trustee designation provision.
It is true that the ESA reflects Congress' intent to take
what steps are necessary to protect endangered species. 16
U.S.C. § 1531(a)-(b). Nonetheless, the ESA controls only
what steps the Secretary of the Interior is to take when a spe-
cies is listed or is proposed for listing. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533-36.
The statute's extensive and explicit directions to the Secre-
tary do not place him in the position of a trustee for these
resources. A trustee is required to use his trust for the sole
benefit of the beneficiary. The ESA requires the Secretary to
weigh the costs and benefits associated with designating a
particular habitat as "critical," and it permits the secretary
to allow certain "takings" and exceptions. 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1533(6)(2), 1539. These actions are not consistent with the
ordinary responsibilities of a trustee.
2. The Endangered Species Act does not impose a
managerial role on the federal government
for the benefit of endangered species.
If the lower court did not conclude that the ESA put the
federal government in the position of a trustee for endan-
gered species, the language of CERCLA requires that the
court must at least have concluded that the ESA gave the
government a managerial or controlling role over the natural
resources. Such a conclusion would be contrary to the statu-
tory language. The ESA has not placed the federal govern-
ment in the position of managing or controlling TLC's
property or the resources on it.
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The ESA requires that the Secretary of the Interior des-
ignate critical habitat for the effected species, and that he
promulgate regulations prohibiting actions that would en-
danger the species' survival. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(b)(2),
1533(4)(d). In addition, "the Secretary shall develop and im-
plement plans.., for the conservation and survival of endan-
gered species." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(4)(F)(1). In the case of the
blue robin and the purple daisy, these regulations apparently
allowed TLC to continue logging operations in the forest. (R.
1). Nothing in the opinion indicates otherwise, so the logging
company could log as long as its operations did not impact the
species.
Further, just because the secretary requires precautions
to be taken or prohibits certain acts does not mean that the
secretary is "managing" or "controlling" a particular resource
even though ESA requires that the Secretary, to the maxi-
mum extent practicable incorporate in each plan "a descrip-
tion of such site-specific management actions as may be
necessary to achieve the plan's goal for the conservation and
survival of the species." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(b)(i). To hold
otherwise would mean that every time an authority promul-
gated a regulation concerning wildlife or land, or every time
that a county zoning board passed a zoning regulation, that
the government was "managing or controlling" the resource
within the meaning of CERCLA § 107(f)(1). This reading
would be inconsistent with Congress' expressed desire to
limit the application of this section. The difference in CER-
CLA's provisions concerning the treatment of the private ver-
sus United States and states suggests that Congress "could
have intended to limit the right of recovery for natural re-
source damages to the United States and the states." Mayor
and Council of the Borough of Rockaway v. Klockner & Klock-
ner, 811 F. Supp. 1039, 1049 (1993). "While CERCLA in its
broadest terms may be viewed as legislation to ensure the
cleanup of toxic waste sites, the legislative history of the Act,
... suggests a concern on the part of Congress that unwise
and excessive clean-up activity be restrained." Stepan Chem.
Co., 713 F. Supp. at 1488 n.12.
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F. The federal government does not have any other
interest in the property or its natural resources to
bring it within CERCLA § 107(t)(1).
Without the ability to use the ESA as an indication of
statutorily mandated trusteeship, management, or control in
the TLC property, the federal government must be able to
demonstrate an alternative basis for asserting a CERCLA
§ 107(f)(1) trusteeship. This it cannot do. It does not own the
property or the resources on it. Nor is the property part of
any federal management program. Therefore, the lower
court's holding that a CERCLA sec. 107(f)(1) natural re-
sources trusteeship was proper must be reversed. Where the
statutory language is plain, the court's duty is clear; apply
the statute to the facts. CERCLA § 107(f)(1) states that the
state authority shall designate a natural resources trustee
when those natural resources belong to, are managed by, are
controlled by, or are appertaining to the state. Although the
scope of CERCLA is intended to be broad, the language of the
statute and the legislative intent make clear that CERCLA is
not without limits. It does not apply to natural resources on
privately owned land.
The natural resources at issue in this case are located on
private land. Unless the state or federal government can
prove that they are managing or controlling these resources,
the NUDNR has no basis for asserting a CERCLA § 107(f)(1)
trusteeship over TLC's property. The NUDNR has not estab-
lished this basis. The state of New Union does not manage or
control the wildlife on the timber company's property. De-
spite the federal government's strong interest in protecting
the endangered species in the forest, the Endangered Species
Act does not create a managerial or controlling role for the
federal government.
Without ownership, management, or control the state
cannot assert a natural resources trusteeship over TLC's
land. Therefore, the District Court's decision must be
reversed.
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ARGUMENT II
II. TLC IS NOT EXCUSED FROM LIABILITY BY
CERCLA § 107(b) DEFENSES.
A. Legislative framework details liability standards
and applicable defenses allowed by the CERCLA
statute.
The statutory framework of CERCLA imposes liability
on TLC. TLC has not established by a preponderance of the
evidence that it falls within the limited statutory exceptions
for parties who are otherwise liable. The intent of Congress
in enacting CERCLA was to "provide for liability, compensa-
tion, cleanup, and emergency response for hazardous sub-
stances released into the environment." Pub. L. No. 96-510,
94 Stat. 2767 at 3038 (1980). As a result, CERCLA § 107(a)
provides wide sweeping and expansive coverage of parties lia-
ble under CERCLA. In contrast CERCLA § 107(b) provides a
limited number of defenses which have been narrowly
interpreted.
B. TLC is Liable for Response Costs and Natural
Resources Damages as Defined in § 107(a)(1) of
CERCLA.
To impose liability on TLC, NUDNR and T2M must es-
tablish that: (1) the area affected by the chemical spill is a
facility; (2) there has been a release or a threatened release of
a hazardous substance from the facility; (3) response costs
were incurred as a result of the release or threatened release;
(4) TLC meets the criteria for inclusion in one of CERCLA's
classes of persons subject to liability. Lincoln Properties, Ltd.
v. Higgins, No. CIV.S-91-76ODFL/GGH, 1993 WL 217429, at
*17 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 21,1993). The affected area, where the
hazardous leachate came to be located is a facility as defined
in CERCLA "any site or area where a hazardous substance
has been deposited ... or otherwise come to be located." 42
U.S.C § 9601(9). Courts have given this definition a broad in-
terpretation. 3550 Stevens Creek Assoc. v. Barclays Bank,
915 F.2d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Structure built with as-
bestos insulation and fire retardants is a "facility" within the
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meaning of CERCLA"); Lincoln Properties, 1993 WL 217429
at *18. (dry cleaning shops where hazardous substance had
"come to be located" held to be facilities).
A hazardous substance, the highly acidic leachate, es-
caped from the facility into the environment. CERCLA de-
fines a "release" as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leach-
ing, dumping, or disposing into the environment." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(20). "The presence of hazardous substances in the
soil, surface water, or groundwater of a site demonstrates a
'release'." Lincoln Properties 1993 WL 217429 at *19 (citing
to United States v. Hardage, 761 F. Supp. 1501, 1510 (W.D.
OKL. 1990)). Leachate from the facility was released into the
soil and the root systems of both the purple daisies and the
trees and shrubs, where the blue robins nest. (R. 3).
NUDEP responded to the "release." NUDEP conducted
an on-site assessment of the spill area; NUDEP submitted a
bill for $21,000 to TLC and T2M for expenses NUDEP in-
curred while conducting the on-site assessment. T2M paid
the entire bill. In addition, NUDNR has instituted this law-
suit seeking natural resource damages, from TLC and T2M.
CERCLA § 107(a)(1) states that liability will be imposed
on "the owner or operator of a facility." 42 U.S.C. § 9607
(a)(1). It is undisputed TLC is the owner of the property af-
fected by the chemical spill. (R. 1). Since TLC is the owner of
the facility, TLC is jointly and severally liable for cleanup
costs and natural resource damages assessed by this court,
unless TLC proves it is entitled to one or a combination of
the statutorily defined defenses. United States v. Monsanto,
858 F.2d 160, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct.
1356 (1989) (joint and several liability appropriate where
traditional principles of common law would require it);
United States v. Marisol, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 833, 842 (M.D.
Pa. 1989) (courts have consistently held liability under CER-
CLA is joint and several, except where harm is divisible).
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C. TLC Does Not Qualify for Third Party Defense, Act
of God Defense, or a Combination of Defenses.
TLC asserts that it is excused from liability by CERCLA
§ 107(b)'s third-party defense and act of God defense, either
alone or in combination. Exempt from CERCLA liability
under CERCLA § 107 defenses are those:
who can, establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the release or threat of a release of a hazardous substance
and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely
by-(1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or omis-
sion of a third party other than an employee or agent of the
defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in con-
nection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or
indirectly, with the defendant..., if the defendant estab-
lishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exer-
cised due care with respect to the hazardous substance
concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of
such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and
circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against any
foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and
the consequences that could forseeably result from such
acts or omissions; (4) any combination of the foregoing
paragraphs. 42 U.S.C § 9607(b).
The district court found TLC not liable for natural re-
source damages based on a combination of CERCLA § 107(b)
defenses. Judge Remus based his opinion on the following
factors: (1) "the T2M site was clean when TLC sold it to
T2M"; (2) "TLC had no direct deed relationship with T2M";
(3) "TLC had nothing to do with T2M's operations"; (4)
"heavy rains contributed to the impoundment break." (R. 6).
First, the T2M site is not the property for which NUDNR
is seeking natural resource damages. Liability is being as-
sessed against TLC as the current owner of a "facility," not as
the former owner of Site 18.
Next, contrary to the finding of the district court, TLC
does have a direct deed relationship with T2M. The deed T2M
received for the purchase of Site 18 includes a transferable
right of entry and exit along Access Road #5. TLC owns and
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maintains Access Road #5. The same transferable right of en-
try and exit was in the deed executed between TLC and Mine-
Finders. (R. 5). TLC is fully aware that the only access to into
and out of the T2M property is by way of TLC's access road.
TLC also understands that this access road, while not a pos-
sessory interest for T2M, acts as a basis for a continuing con-
tractual relationship between the two parties. By severing
this relationship, TLC would be held accountable. See Hin-
man v. Barnes, 66 N.E.2d 911, 915 (1946); Restatement
(First) of Property § 450 (1936).
Since TLC has a contractual relationship with T2M, to
escape liability under CERCLA's third-party defense TLC
must prove that it "exercised due care with respect to the
hazardous substance concerned" and "took precautions
against foreseeable acts or omissions" of T2M and its contrac-
tors. 42 U.S.C § 9607(b)(3)(a)-(b); (R. 5). TLC was aware that
Access Road #5 provides the only method by land to enter or
exit Site 18. (R. 2). TLC was aware that T2M would use Site
18 to mine unionite ore. In fact it was the discovery of the
"richest vein of ore" that precipitated TLC's decision to sell
Site 18. (R. 2). The waste leachate from T2M's mining opera-
tion is hauled off Site 18 by trucks entering and exiting along
Access Road #5. Id.
TLC was aware of T2M's mining operations, yet TLC
failed to exercise precautionary measures to protect its prop-
erty. Installation of a swale or berm to direct drainage away
from the portion of TLC's property where the endangered
species are located would have prevented or lessened the se-
verity of damage to the endangered species habitat. TLC did
not notify T2M that the mining operations were located
within the proximity of endangered species' habitat. TLC did
not request T2M construct a diversion to prevent run off from
the mining operation from entering the endangered species'
habitat.
TLC also asserts that a "contractual relationship" as de-
fined in CERCLA sec. 101(35) only takes into account a deed
which is executed after the release of a hazardous substance
on the property. (R. 6). TLC's assertion is contrary to the
plain. language of statute, CERCLA § 101(35) states:
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"contractual relationship" for the purpose of section
9607(b)(3) of this title, includes, but is not limited to, land
contracts, deeds, or other instruments transferring title or
possession, UNLESS the real property on which the facility
concerned is located was acquired by the defendant after
the disposal or placement of the hazardous substance on,
in, or at the facility, and one or more of the circumstances
described in clause (i),(ii),(iii) is also established by the de-
fendant. [emphasis added].
The "contractual relationship" definition was added as
part of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986. The purpose of the definition is to "clarify and con-
firm" the defense to liability landowners may have "under
limited circumstances." H.R. Rep. No. 99-962, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. at 3279 (1986). The definition is framed in the nega-
tive. A land contract or deed subjects the defendant to liabil-
ity UNLESS acquisition of the property where the facility is
located occurred after disposal of a hazardous substance on
the property. J.B. Ruhl, Third-Party Defense to Hazardous
Waste Liability: Narrowing the Contractual Relationship Ex-
ception, 29 S.Tex. L.J. 291, 307 (1988). All "land contracts,
deeds or other instruments transferring title or possession"
are included as contractual relationships creating liability
unless the party is able to prove a third-party defense under
CERCLA § 107(b)(3). A "contractual relationship" under
CERCLA § 101(35) is not limited to deeds executed after dis-
posal of a hazardous substance.
Third, T2M agrees that the operation and maintenance
of the surface impoundment was conducted solely by T2M
and T2M's contractors, all of which are "third parties" in rela-
tion to TLC. (R. 5). However, the legislative history of CER-
CLA shows Congress "specifically rejected including a
causation requirement in CERCLA § 106(a)." New York v.
Shore Realty Co., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985). As a
result, in CERCLA claims the causation element is elimi-
nated from the plaintiff's case. Persons who are otherwise
liable cannot escape liability based on their lack of contribu-
tion to the release or threat of release. Marisol, 725 F. Supp.
at 840. Liability has been adjudged to be strict, joint and sev-
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eral. As a result a party's liability for costs and damages
arises "without any evidence of fault on their part but merely
by their status." H.R. Rep. No. 99-253(V), 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. at 3125 (1986).
Fourth, the district court correctly held that the heaviest
rainfall in ten years is not the type of unanticipated natural
disaster or exceptional natural phenomenon that Congress
had in mind as an act of God. (R. 6). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1). The
court in United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053,
(C.D. Cal. 1987) dismissed the defendant's claim that heavy
rainfall was a "natural disaster which constituted an act of
God." The court found heavy rainfall to be a foreseeable
event. Therefore, the damage caused by the rainfall was pre-
ventable, through properly designed storm water channels.
Id. at 1061. In addition, while T2M has stipulated that the
"heavy volume of liquid being held" caused the crack in the
impoundment, T2M asserts that the crack could have devel-
oped even without a rain event. The impoundment was only
"nearly as full as it becomes when it is emptied on the 45th
day." (R. 3). The crack in the structure could have as easily
developed by end of the 45th day without the heavy rains.
The volume of liquid at the time of crack on April 27, 1992
was no greater than it would normally have been at the end
of the 45th day of operation. (R. 3).
As a result, TLC cannot escape liability under an act of
God defense. Since TLC has not established either a third-
party defense or an act of God defense, the combination of
defenses described in CERCLA § 107 is not available to TLC.
Clearly, under the plain language of CERCLA TLC is a
"covered person" that is not excused from liability by the stat-
utorily defined defenses set forth in section 107(b). Yet, TLC
contends the court should not let the form of the statute over-
ride an equitable interpretation of the statute's substance.
According to TLC, while the scope of CERCLA lability is
broad and expansive, Congress' intention was to pull in as
many responsible parties as possible, not to impose liability
on the innocent victims of a hazardous substance release or
threatened release.
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In response, T2M asserts that it has long been estab-
lished that when the language of the statute is "clear it is
conclusive" there is nothing for the courts to interpret. Chev-
ron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1983); Webster v. Luther, 163 U.S. 331, 342
(1896).
D. TLC can not be construed as some type of innocent
bystander who should not be liable for the
damage caused to the critical habitat. Selling
the property through a third party broker
does not absolve TLC from its responsibility to the
environment.
In addition to the clear language of the statute, T2M con-
tends that it would be against public policy to have a property
owner such as T2M be held liable for the entire cost of the
accident, to include the re-establishment of a habitat for the
purple daisy. In this case, TLC was fully aware of what type
of operation would be conducted on the property after it was
sold. It was TLC who initiated the contact with Mine-Finders
after discovery of the vein of unionite ore. If TLC is not held
liable for the natural resource damages, it will receive a
windfall profit. Prior to the chemical spill, TLC could not
harvest timber in or around the area of the endangered spe-
cies habitat without federal approval. 2 If the endangered
species are relocated to a state owned wilderness area, their
former habitat, on TLC's property, will be available for com-
mercial timber harvest. TLC was also fully aware of the loca-
tion of the impoundment and the contents of the
impoundment. However, even though TLC is known as an
environmentally conscious company, no steps were taken to
protect the critical habitat located adjacent to the impound-
ment. The cost to TLC to protect the habitat would have been
2. Under the Endangered Species Act 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (section 10) TLC
would need to submit a conservation plan. The plan would need to demonstrate
that any taking of endangered species would be incidental to lawful activity and
any incidental taking would be minimized. A "taking" is defined to mean "to
harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to
attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
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minimal compared with the resulting damage costs associ-
ated with accident. Certainly, a company as large and profit-
able as TLC could afford to protect the small location of the
habitat without incurring large costs. As a point of reference,
TLC made $200,000 from the sale of the property, which
equates to less than 1/15th of one percent of the profit gener-
ated by TLC in 1992.
T2M has conducted its mining operation in full accord-
ance with all federal and state regulations. T2M has done
everything the government requested and has been a respon-
sible business operator. Conversely, by selling the property
to the mining company and taking no precautions for the pro-
tection of the critical habitat, TLC has effectively reduced the
economic potential in New Union. The loss of tourism dollars
as a result of the accident will harm the local community but
TLC will continue to log the area and profit from its opera-
tions. It is difficult to conjecture that this was the intent of
Congress when CERCLA defenses were established.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Tyler-2 Mining Inc., respect-
fully requests this court reverse the findings of the district
court.
Respectfully submitted
Kimberly A. Manuelides
Christine Nagle
Gary De Bruin
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